FORD REORGANIZATION
How Ford lost its way
Bad product choices helped trigger steep drop in market share
By Jim Mateja
Tribune auto reporter
Published January 24, 2006
The most stunning aspect of what went wrong at Ford is how easy it is to explain.
"Selling what you have rather than what consumers want doesn't make sense," said Bill Ford Jr., chairman of the auto company bearing the family name. "It used to be that you'd build it and they'd buy it. But that's wrong, that's antiquated. Now it will be that if they will buy it, we will build it."
It was a telling admission on a day when Ford acknowledged its problems by announcing sharp employee and manufacturing cuts designed to bring the company back to profitability in North America by 2008.
"The reason Ford is in this mess is product, product, product," said Dave Healy, analyst with Burnham Securities. "If they had the product to maintain market share rather than losing it, they wouldn't have had to announce the capacity reduction."
Analysts said Ford made several wrong choices. It made a significant bet on sport-utility vehicles--once the sweetheart of buyers--but sales of those began to cool even before gas prices spiked to more than $3 a gallon in September.
The company has a Taurus sedan that was once the biggest-selling car in America, but it simply got older as Toyota and Honda brought out new Camry and Accord models every few years, including gas/electric models.
It also fell behind in the mini-van campaign, coming slow to the party and slow to add the latest innovations like sliding rear doors on both sides of the vehicle.
The result is that between 2000 and 2005, Ford lost 6.5 points of market share as sales decreased by 1 million units, said Rebecca Lindland, senior market analyst for Global Insight.
"By building products to fill plants rather than fill consumer needs, Ford lost touch with what consumers want and with consumers' changing needs," she said.
Meanwhile, the market was only getting more competitive, with the South Koreans, like the Japanese in the 1970s, moving in. They started with low-priced, high-mileage cars and, once established, moved into midsize and entry-level luxury cars, along with SUVs and mini-vans.
"While there's nothing they can do to stop Toyota, they also underestimated the ability of Hyundai and Kia to grab market share," Lindland said.
But Ford's troubles go beyond product, added Jim Hossack, vice president of AutoPacific, an industry research and consulting firm. Ford and the other domestic automakers have no one but themselves to blame.
He's talking about the huge sums paid to United Auto Workers members for health-care and pension costs.
"The long-standing relations between the U.S. auto industry and the UAW were forged between 1945 and 1975, when there was no significant foreign competition," he said. "It didn't matter what the manufacturers paid the workers as long as the workers at GM, Ford and Chrysler all got the same deal."
These deals came at a big price.
U.S. automakers became uncompetitive in terms of cost so they couldn't afford to compete on product, Hossack said. "The Japanese could add more features and focus on more quality because they had more money to do so," he said.
"Now you have import competition with young workers in new [U.S.] plants without UAW restrictions and benefits. Those with competitive costs grow, those without competitive costs don't.
"And it's not just autos. I don't care who the chairman or president or chief designer is, if you aren't competitive in costs, it means you are in trouble. Can Ford survive? Sure. Can it prosper? That's not clear yet."
On Monday, Ford spelled out only the barest details of how it will make a comeback, focusing on the announced closing of plants and loss of jobs